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In previous work, I have argued that the formal equality model has not
been well equipped to help attain substantive equality for individuals with
disabilities, because it does not correctly target who is deserving of
assistance and it has not been effective in developing appropriate remedies.' I
have suggested that Congress presumed under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act that an integrated educational environment is
better than a more segregated educational environment in the K-12 context,
even though the available empirical data do not support that presumption. 2 I
argued that the integration presumption was reflexively borrowed from the
racial context without consideration of whether it was effective in the
disability context.3 I have also applied an anti-subordination perspective to
the area of voting to argue that we could do a better job of improving the
availability of voting to individuals with disabilities if we moved beyond the
integration paradigm to consider how to make in-home voting more
accessible to individuals with disabilities.4 Throughout that work, I have
been agnostic about the remedy of integration and have insisted that
integration be chosen as a remedy only when it can be shown to be likely to
produce substantive equality relying, in part, on empirical data.5
Because my anti-subordination framework, which I have recently applied
to the disability context, was initially developed in the race context,6 I have
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1 See generally RuTH COLKER, WHEN IS SEPARATE UNEQUAL?: A DISABILITY
PERSPECTIVE (forthcoming 2009).
2 See Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 789, 795-796 (2006).
3 Id. at 790.
4 See Daniel P. Tokaji & Ruth Colker, Absentee Voting by People with Disabilities:
Promoting Access and Integrity, 38 McGEORGE L. REv. 1015, 1017 (2007).
5 See generally Colker, supra note 1.
6 Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1007-08 (1986) ("Under the anti-subordination perspective, it is
inappropriate for certain groups in society to have subordinated status because of their
lack of power in society as a whole .... From an anti-subordination perspective, both
facially differentiating and facially neutral policies are invidious only if they perpetuate
racial or sexual hierarchy.").
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decided to return to the race context to see what further insights might arise
from that perspective. My anti-subordination perspective can provide two
useful insights into the thorny question of the use of race to attain integration
in the K-12 public education context. First, this perspective can help us
understand why race-conscious tools must continue to be necessary to attain
substantive equality. An equality perspective that is not constrained by
principles of formal equality will select race-conscious tools in the education
area when those tools are likely to improve the educational performance of
historically subordinated groups such as African-American children. Second,
the remedies that are selected under an anti-subordination perspective will be
driven by the empirical data rather than unwarranted presumptions. These
data can help us identify that certain types of integrated educational
environments are likely to attain positive outcomes for African-American
children. The law should support school districts choosing the tools needed
to attain those educational environments even if race-conscious means need
to be part of that tool chest. In fact, this Article will argue that a failure to use
race-conscious tools is likely to lead to unacceptable educational results for
many African-American children. The Supreme Court's formal equality
model has caused it to leap to various conclusions about appropriate
educational programs without examining any empirical literature in depth.
This Article will examine the litigation involving Seattle, Washington,
and Jefferson County, Kentucky, to make those arguments. These school
districts were the target of extensive litigation, as resolved by the Supreme
Court in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1.7 In both cases, the school districts used race-conscious measures to
help attain racial integration in their public schools, and, in both cases, the
Supreme Court used a formal equality model to resolve the dispute.8 Chief
Justice Roberts authored the opinion for the Court striking down those plans,
in which he made the classic formal equality statement, "The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of
race." 9 That approach, I will argue, is simplistic and simply wrong. It reflects
a formal equality rather than anti-subordination perspective.
In Part I of this Article, I will discuss the evolution of the specific plans
adopted by both school districts so the reader can see the modest nature of
the use of race in both cities. Further, I will show that this modest use of race
was not a result of data or literature suggesting that such limited uses of race
7 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) [hereinafter Parents Involved].
8 Id. at 2746, 2768.
9 Id. at 2768. This statement was also contained in the Ninth Circuit's dissenting
opinion. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1222
(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Bea, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Parents Involved 9th Circ. IV]
("The way to end racial discrimination is to stop discriminating by race.").
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are most likely to attain the best possible educational gains for minority
children. In fact, as I will argue in Part II, the empirical literature suggests
that more educational gains would have been likely to have been made
through increased use of racial factors in school assignments. The modest use
of race was in response to community pressure (by white parents) not to use
race at all in school assignment and in response to an awareness of the
restrictions imposed by constitutional law. Formal equality has become a
political and litigation tool for some white parents to derail an attempt by
school districts to create an educational program that is likely to be more
successful for minority children.
From an anti-subordination perspective, the courts have the racial
equality model exactly backward. The empirical literature, which I will
discuss in Part II, suggests that the only way to end race discrimination is to
take race into account in school assignments from kindergarten onward. If
the school plans were to be struck down in Seattle or Jefferson County, they
should have been struck down for not using race enough. School districts,
and courts, are caught in the limitations of the formal equality model and
therefore try to create school assignment plans that use race as little as
possible to achieve token integration. Such token integration is not likely to
attain substantive equality for minority children and, ironically, is likely to be
struck down by the courts as being too race-conscious. In this Article, I will
argue that we should abandon a formal equality model and replace it with an
anti-subordination model that measures equality by virtue of the substantive
educational results attained by school districts, not whether they used race-
conscious means to attain those results.
I. SEATTLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY
A. Seattle
The record in the Seattle case shows how difficult it is to get the
community to cooperate with attempts to integrate schools at the youngest
grades, and to accept efforts that have a mandatory school assignment
component. In 1977, Seattle adopted a plan that "divided the district into
zones, within which majority-dominated elementary schools were paired
with minority-dominated elementary schools to achieve desegregation.
Mandatory high school assignments were linked to elementary school
assignments, although various voluntary transfer options were available."10
A state initiative soon attempted to stop this plan, although the United States
Supreme Court ultimately declared the initiative unconstitutional. I I Seattle
10 Parents Involved 9th Circ. IV, 426 F.3d at 1168.
11 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 470 (1982).
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modified its desegregation plan in 1988 to decrease its reliance on mandatory
busing, which, under the prior plan, had required the mandatory busing of
nonwhite students in disproportionate numbers.12 Community dissatisfaction,
rather than educational outcomes, seems to have caused these changes. 13 In
1998, Seattle made further modifications. This time, it limited its diversity
efforts to the high schools, and 90 percent of the students in the district were
assigned to their first-choice school. "[O]f the approximately 3,000 incoming
students entering Seattle high schools in the 2000-01 school year,
approximately 300 were assigned to an oversubscribed high school based on
the race-based tiebreaker."' 14
The Seattle School Board decided to make race a factor in assignment to
public high schools in 1998 in order to create more equal educational
opportunities in the city. The school district acknowledged that despite its
best efforts, "it remains a stark reality that disproportionately, the schools
located in the northern end of the city continue to be the most popular and
prestigious, and competition for assignment to those schools is keen."'15
Because of housing patterns segregated on the basis of both race and
socioeconomic factors, it also remained true that minority students tended to
live in south Seattle and would not be assigned to schools in north Seattle if
neighborhood housing patterns exclusively determined school choice. 16
Hence, the Seattle School Board created what it called a "tiebreaker"
mechanism for schools that were not racially balanced, which it defined as
schools in which the racial composition deviated by more than 15 percent
from the overall population of the students attending Seattle's public
schools. 17 It limited application of the tiebreaker to students entering the
ninth grade and did not use it for students in the higher grades. 18 Although it
experimented with using mandatory busing to achieve racial balance, it
abandoned busing in light of parental complaints and, instead, moved to a
system whereby parents would request their "choice."' 19 The racial balancing
plan affected who was given his or her first choice from those who chose one
of the five most popular schools as their first choice but did not result in
12 See Parents Involved 9th Circ. IV, 426 F.3d at 1168.
13 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 137 F. Supp. 2d
1224, 1225 (W.D. Wash. 2001) [hereinafter Parents Involved District].
14 Parents Involved 9th Circ. IV, 426 F.3d at 1170.
15 Parents Involved District, 137 F. Supp.2d at 1225.
16 See id. at 1238-39.
1 7 Id. at 1226.
18 Id. at 1239.
19 Id at 1225.
1092 [Vol. 69:1089
FIVE TAKES ON HELLER
anyone's being bussed to those schools who had not selected that school as a
first choice.
Litigation ensued after the adoption of the 1998 plan. 20 Two of the lead
plaintiffs alleged that they were assigned to Ingraham High School rather
than one of the three premier high schools in Seattle. They alleged that
school buses were not available to transport them to Ingraham so that they
would have had to spend over four hours commuting to high school each
day. Because of the unacceptability of that option, the parents chose to send
them to private schools that were presumably closer to their homes. 21 The
Washington Supreme Court later noted when it heard the case that the long
commute occurred because the students refused to list the names of any local
schools on their school choice form. The Court concluded, "[I]t is impossible
to determine what their commute would have been had they participated in
the selection process. '22 The district court upheld the plan as meeting various
constitutional requirements. 23 Its primary focus was on whether the program
used a racial preference as little as possible to attain racial diversity. The
court's opinion focused little attention on two factors that I suggest should be
important: (1) whether there was evidence that the academic performance of
minority students who benefited from this racial "tiebreaker" appeared to
improve as a result of their ability to be educated at one of the excellent
schools in predominantly white neighborhoods and (2) whether this program
was effective given that it did not begin until ninth grade and was only
mandatory for one year of school. Given the greater educational resources
that the court acknowledged existed at the most popular schools, it is highly
likely that students saw an improvement in educational performance upon
being admitted to one of those schools. Nonetheless, the opinion contains no
discussion of that fact. Although the educational benefits from integration
may have been higher if adopted in earlier grades, it appears that Seattle
abandoned using race as a factor in the lower grades for political rather than
educational reasons.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plan violated
Washington state law, but did not reach the federal constitutional issues.24 It
did not discuss the effectiveness of the education offered under the plan; it
focused entirely on whether the plan could be considered an impermissible
race-conscious plan. Several months later, a petition for rehearing was
20 Parents Involved District, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1224.
21 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 285 F.3d 1236, 1241
[hereinafter Parents Involved 9th Circ. 1]
22 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 72 P.3d 151, 156 n.4
(Wash. 2003) [hereinafter Parents Involved Wash. S. Ct.].
23 Parents Involved District, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1232-39.
24 Parents Involved 9th Circ. I, 285 F.3d at 1253.
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granted by a three-judge panel and the first appellate opinion was vacated.25
The Ninth Circuit requested that the Washington Supreme Court agree to
hear the novel state initiative legal issues raised by the case, because the prior
decision had rested entirely on other state laws. Although the earlier Ninth
Circuit injunction was lifted, the Seattle School District chose to suspend
using race as a factor in school assignments.26
The Washington Supreme Court agreed to hear the case and concluded
that the plan did not violate Washington's statutory or constitutional law.27
Although the opinion did not note any specific evidence about the academic
success of Washington's integration program, it did note:
[T]here is strong empirical evidence that a racially diverse school
population provides educational benefits for all students. Most students
educated in racially diverse schools demonstrated improved critical thinking
skills-the ability to both understand and challenge views which are
different from their own. Research has also shown that a diverse
educational experience improves race relations, reduces prejudicial
attitudes, and achieves a more democratic and inclusive experience for all
citizens. 28
The Court, however, does not discuss whether those generalities have been
shown to be true in Seattle.
After the decision of the Washington Supreme Court, the case returned to
the Ninth Circuit. 29 Once again, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the plan.30 This
time it did so under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.31 The Ninth Circuit's opinion made brief mention of the
academic achievement of the students at Seattle's various schools, noting that
students at the more elite schools had significantly higher standardized test
scores than students at the less desirable high schools.32 But the opinion
contained no discussion of how those test scores might have been influenced
by students' transferring from one high school to another. The Ninth Circuit
concluded that the Seattle plan was unconstitutional because its use of race
25 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 294 F.3d 1084,
1084-85 (9th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Parents Involved 9th Circ. 11].
26 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 958
(9th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Parents Involved 9th Circ. III].
27 Parents Involved Wash. S. Ct., 72 P.3d at 166.
28 Id. at 162 (footnotes omitted).
29 Parents Involved 9th Circ. III, 377 F.3d 949.
30 Id. at 988.
31 Id
32 Id. at 954 n.1.
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was not sufficiently narrowly tailored.33 The use of race was too mechanical,
and other race-neutral mechanisms were not sufficiently explored to attain
diversity.
This decision was not the end of the story in the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth
Circuit voted to hear the case en banc. 34 More than a year later, the en banc
panel affirmed the injunction issued nearly four years earlier in favor of the
school district. 35 The Ninth Circuit en banc opinion summarized the
educational and social benefits that can result from increased diversity, such
as improved critical thinking skills, socialization and citizenship advantages,
and networking advantages. 36 But the court did not examine any evidence as
to whether the specific plan adopted in Seattle succeeded in achieving those
benefits in that section of its opinion. The only evidence specific to the
benefits attained in Seattle was brief testimony by the principal of one high
school, who stated that "students of different races and backgrounds tend to
have significant interactions both in class and outside of class. When I came
to [the high school], there were racial tensions in the school, reflected in
fighting and disciplinary problems. These kind of problems have, to a large
extent, disappeared. ' '37 The dissent notes that the majority only cited the
studies that described the benefits that flow from integration and observed
that other studies have reached different conclusions. 38 Like the majority, the
dissent does not point to any evidence to suggest which results-positive or
negative-are likely to result in the Seattle context.
The primary focus of both the majority and dissent is whether racial
diversity could be attained through means that were not overtly racial. All the
judges seemed to agree that racial diversity was good, in itself, but they also
seemed to agree that race-conscious means to achieve racial diversity are,
themselves, a harm to be avoided. Hence, if Seattle could attain racial
diversity through entirely race-neutral means such as a lottery or even the use
of socioeconomic status, then the result of racial diversity would be
permissible. The only reason that Seattle found itself the subject of protracted
litigation was that it used an overt racial factor to attain racial diversity.
The presence or absence of race as a factor is the primary focus of the
courts' opinions. The lead plaintiffs alleged that their first-choice schools
were oversubscribed and that they were assigned to a school far from their
home that would require four hours for a roundtrip commute on public
33 Id. at 980.
34 Parents Involved 9th Circ. IV, 426 F.3d at 1172.
35 Id. at 1166.
36 1d at 1174-75.
37 Id. at 1182 (quoting Eric Benson, the principal of Nathan Hale High School).
38 Id. at 1205-07.
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transportation. Although many students of their race were able to attend
those first-choice schools, their odds of being able to attend would have
greatly increased if they were nonwhite because, apparently, every nonwhite
applicant was admitted to those first-choice schools. The harm they describe
is a long commute, which they may have been able to avoid if race had not
been a factor in school selection.
The problem with this logic and focus of the various opinions is that the
plaintiffs' first-choice high school would still have been oversubscribed
under open admissions if race had not been a factor and Seattle had a system
of student choice in admissions. Some kind of tiebreaker would still have
been necessary, and they could have found themselves not admitted to their
first-choice schools and assigned to less convenient options. Would their
"harm" have been lessened if they knew they got an inferior school
assignment because of the operation of a race-neutral lottery? I would
suggest that they have learned to "game" the legal system by describing their
harm in racial terms when, in fact, they simply wanted access to the best
education offered by the public school system in Seattle. They, of course, had
no reason to complain for a decade when the operation of the status quo gave
them access to white-dominated neighborhood schools. It was only when
they lost access to their white enclave that they thought to complain. When
they no longer could get free access to their local white-dominated public
school, they left the public system and paid to have access to a presumably
white-dominated private school. They were only "harmed" when the rules of
the game no longer benefited whites who lived in middle-class
neighborhoods.
On the basis of the empirical literature discussed in Part II, I would
suggest that to the extent there is a problem with the Seattle plan, it is that it
is too narrowly tailored. Afraid to step on the toes of the public and courts,
the City of Seattle came up with a plan that would help a small percentage of
the minority students in Seattle who happened to win the lottery to attend one
of the predominantly white schools. The formal equality framework under
which Seattle had to defend its plan made it virtually impossible to develop
an effective, broad-ranging plan. The fact that the Supreme Court could
strike down even this extremely narrowly tailored plan suggests that no
effective plan is likely to pass constitutional muster because, in terms of the
empirical literature, an effective plan would have to start in kindergarten, be
widespread, and be mandatory. Such a race-conscious plan might achieve
integration and high-quality education, but its use of race would not permit it
even to attain serious political or judicial consideration.
The quandary faced by the City of Seattle is caused by the illogical state
of equal protection jurisprudence, which has been dominated by the
principles of formal equality. The law has developed from the statement from
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Brown that "separate can never be equal" 39 to mean that race can virtually
never be an overt factor in trying to attain high-quality education for minority
children. Racial diversity is only a permissible objective if it can be achieved
through awkward, race-neutral means that, at best, attain incomplete
diversity and leave the overwhelming majority of minority students still
being educated in substandard educational environments.
What if our lens would change and, instead, we would ask what
mechanisms are most likely to attain high-quality education for as many
minority students as possible, when a school district has a history of
substandard education for those students? Then, we might strike down the
Seattle plan for not going far enough by still relegating the majority of
minority students to a substandard educational environment, especially in the
pivotal early grades. Embracing notions of formal equality, the Supreme
Court, by contrast, has said that Seattle has gone too far in devising a very
modest plan that seeks only to attain racial diversity for less than half of the
students attending ninth grade in their school system.
The school system's desire to attain racial diversity in terms that might
be acceptable to the public and the courts caused it to select means that were
not even consistent with the empirical literature on the educational benefits
of diversity. Their diversity plan did not begin until ninth grade, it included
only one year of education (because transferring could occur the following
year), and it was mandatory only if the deviation from random diversity was
more than 15 percent. Because the overall nonwhite population in the school
system was 60 percent, a school would not be subject to the plan if its
nonwhite population was as high as 74 percent. It did not apply in seven of
the ten Seattle public high schools, and the courts do not provide data for
those seven schools. Because schools covered by the plan ranged from 40 to
60 percent nonwhite, though, it is clear that each of the other seven schools is
more than 60 percent nonwhite. Of the four "popular" schools covered by the
plan, in only three did a shift of nonwhites to the school result. Thus, at most,
nonwhites at three of the eleven public high schools operated by the City of
Seattle benefited from the integration plan and only at the senior high school
grades. Did the plan produce any appreciable improvement in the overall
education offered to nonwhites in Seattle? There is no way to know because
the various decisions contain no useful data about educational outcomes.
Seattle published an extensive report in December 2006 that tracked
student performance over time but contained no data on how the setting for
education might affect outcome.40 Did African-American students who
39 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (denouncing the "separate but
equal" doctrine and finding that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal).
4 0 See STEVEN F. WRIGHT, SEATTLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DATA PROFILE: DISTRICT
SUMMARY (2006), http://www.seattleschools.org/area/siso/disprof/2006/Prfl2006al.pdf.
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attended schools in which their representation was nearly 10 percent more or
less than their expected representation in the population benefit from the so-
called advantages of integration? The important point is that a several-
hundred-page report that was filled with empirical data does not even ask any
questions about how racial composition of schools correlates with
educational outcomes. The failure to collect data about the results from
different learning environments makes it difficult for school officials to
structure better learning environments.
B. Kentucky
The litigation in Jefferson County, Kentucky, provides a less complete
record to discuss. The outcome, though, was the same-the Court struck
down the explicit use of race to attain integrated schools. As in Seattle, the
plan for Jefferson County, Kentucky, developed over many years.4 1 The
Kentucky plan, however, is much more comprehensive and complicated.
Kentucky's integration efforts began in 1975 as a result of court-ordered
desegregation. 42 In June 2000, the district court dissolved the desegregation
decree and ordered the school district to stop using racial quotas at Central
High School, and to reevaluate and redesign the admissions procedures in
other magnet schools.43 In response to that court order and community
feedback, the school district ended its use of race in assignments to Central
High School and three other magnet high schools. 44 But it decided to
continue to use race as a factor in what are called "magnet traditional
schools." 45
As did the Seattle plan, the Kentucky plan sought minority school
enrollment within 15 percent of their representation in the student
population.46 For the Jefferson County area, that meant a range between 15
and 50 percent African American. (There were no other minorities well
represented in the population so the court simply considered race in
black/white terms.) The Kentucky plan sought to attain racial integration at
all grades, not merely ninth grade.47
41 McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 841-48 (W.D.
Ky. 2004).
4 2 Id. at 841.
43 Id.
44Id.
45 Id. at 841-42.
4 6 Id. at 842.
47 McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 845.
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The racial guidelines did not apply to kindergarten. 48 For the rest of
elementary school, children were assigned a school within a "cluster." The
clusters were defined, in part, on the basis of racial guidelines in order to
attain racial balance. Students were able to request their first- and second-
choice schools within the cluster, and nearly all children received one of their
two first choices. In middle school and high school, students could attend
their neighborhood school or apply for a nontraditional magnet school.
Racial guidelines were a factor in admission to some of the magnet and
optional programs. 49
The focus of the litigation was on what were described as "traditional
magnet schools." These schools included four elementary, three middle, and
two high schools. 50 The traditional program was also offered within two
schools and was open to students on a districtwide basis. The traditional
schools emphasized basic skills in a highly-structured environment and
parent participation. 51 Race was used in a more overt way at the traditional
schools than at the other schools in the district. Applicants were placed on
four lists: black male, black female, white male, and white female.52
Applicants were chosen from those lists in a way that guaranteed a racial
balance (although race was not a factor in selection into kindergarten).53
Because fewer black than white students tended to apply to traditional
schools, black applicants had a higher chance of acceptance to traditional
schools than white applicants.54
As in the Seattle litigation, the focus of attention was on whether the
program used race as little as possible. The effectiveness of the plan in
achieving high-quality education was, at most, a footnote in the courts'
opinions. The district court recited the general observation that "racial
integration benefits Black students substantially in terms of academic
achievement" but offered no evidence as to whether that generalization held
true for that school system.55 In one footnote, the district court commented
that students reported in a survey that they thought that going to school in an
integrated environment would make them more comfortable working within
an integrated workplace. 56 The district court struck down the plan for
48 Id. at 844.
49 Id. at 842-45.
50 Id. at 845-48.
5 lId.
52 Id. at 847.
53 McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 847.
54 Id. at 848 n.25.
55 Id. at 853.
56 Id. at 854 n.41.
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allocating students to the traditional magnet schools because the means used
looked too much like a quota.57 The court disapproved of the use of separate
lists for blacks and whites and concluded that the school district could have
attained diversity through less race-conscious means. For students who were
not admitted to their first choice because it was oversubscribed, the court
concluded that the harm to those students was greater through the use of two
separate lists of students rather than a general lottery. No one asked whether
the Kentucky plan was successful in improving the academic performance of
minority students. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion
without further reasoning. 58
As with the district court, the focus of the Supreme Court's reasoning
was on whether the plan was sufficiently "narrowly tailored"--whether it
used race as little as possible to achieve integration. The Supreme Court
concluded that the Kentucky plan was unconstitutional because its race-
conscious measures seemed unnecessary to the attainment of diversity. In
Young Elementary, for example, the Court criticized the school district for
not being willing to tolerate an enrollment that was 46.8 percent black. Citing
Jefferson County's claim that it needed to have its schools constitute "at least
20 percent" minority group representation "to be visible enough to make a
difference," the Court noted that 46 percent is far greater than 20 percent and
therefore should not be problematic. 59 But the Court's analysis is overly
simplistic and overlooks data that suggest that schools with such high
concentrations of African Americans are likely to offer poor educational
programs for racial minorities. While it may also be true that racial
minorities need a critical mass of 20 percent participation to attain positive
results in predominantly white educational environments, it is also true that
schools like Young Elementary are also likely to attain poor results for
African-American children.
In theory, Chief Justice Roberts is open to considering evidence about
how racial diversity provides educational benefits. He says, "This working
backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working
forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the
purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent. '60 But it is
hard to know whether he sincerely means that such evidence could be
allowed to support race-conscious measures given his adamant language
about the inappropriateness of using race as a criterion in school admissions.
Although the studies submitted to the Court might have been able to answer
57 Id. at 858, 862-64.
58 McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Schs., 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005).
59 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2756.
60 Id. at 2757.
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some of those questions, the Roberts opinion makes no attempt to analyze the
studies to answer that question. The Court merely asserts that using race-
specific means to help "students see fellow students as individuals rather than
solely as members of a racial group ... is fundamentally at cross-purposes
with that end" without examining any data about students' educational
experiences in various educational environments.61 An examination of our
actual educational experiences, rather than platitudes, might help us shape
effective educational strategies.
C. Observations
If one steps back and looks at the legal reasoning that has developed in
the race context, it makes little sense. School districts are allowed to try to
achieve racial integration so long as they do not use race to achieve that goal.
In other words, if they are devious and find race-neutral ways to achieve
integration, then they are all right. But, if they are explicit about trying to
attain integration by using race-specific means, then their programs are
unlikely to pass constitutional muster.
But why do we care so much about integration? An important reason that
we value integration is a conviction that it helps attain the best possible
education for minority children who have historically languished in
substandard single-race schools. If the explicit use of race is shown not only
to attain integration but to attain high-quality education for minority children,
then such use of race should certainly be permissible. Given our history of
subordination on the basis of race, it is hard to see how race-conscious,
integrated education that attains positive outcomes can be unconstitutional.
Ironically, the courts' disfavor of the use of racial categories has hampered
the ability of school systems to attain high-quality education for racial
minorities. They are forced to use indirect (race-neutral) means or, if they use
race at all, to use it in a very limited manner that is unlikely to be effective.
Hence, the City of Seattle has been put in the uncomfortable position of
defending its use of race in only ninth grade for less than 10 percent of the
students, and it abandoned even that modest use of race in the face of
litigation. Jefferson County, Kentucky, has sought to defend a broader use of
race, but the litigation's fifteen-year history provides little evidence of how
the use of race was connected to improved academic performance for
minority students.
As the next section will demonstrate, it is very likely that minority
students who attend racially integrated schools do perform better
academically than their peers who attend single-race schools. That success,
however, is likely to depend on the explicit use of race to attain meaningful
61 Id. at 2759.
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integration. Unfortunately, Supreme Court jurisprudence will make it
difficult for school districts to attain those kinds of educational benefits.
II. THE EMPIRICAL DATA
In this section, I discuss the empirical data cited by the Court in the
Seattle litigation to argue that the Court did not examine those data
adequately or fairly. Then, I examine empirical data that were available but
not cited by the Court that could provide us with more evidence on what
kinds of educational programs are likely to be effective. The data suggest that
Seattle's modest approach of integrating a few high schools is not likely to be
effective and that Kentucky needed to set a higher threshold for what it
considered an adequate racial balance to attain strong results. But, of course,
from the Court's perspective, such modifications would have made the
programs more rather than less unconstitutional.
A. Empirical Data Cited by the Court
In 1978, Robert Crain and Rita Mahard authored a very thoughtful study
in which they examined seventy-three studies that sought to examine the
effects of school desegregation on black children. Rather than simply
conclude whether desegregation raised the achievement scores of black
students, they sought to identify which factors were most closely correlated
with positive outcomes for black students. 62
Their research revealed that several factors had a positive association
with academic achievement for black children. First, they found that
desegregation was most effective when it occurred at an early age.63 They
concluded that the "critical point" for desegregation to be effective was grade
three or four, a finding that is consistent with other research that has
concluded that that age range is a "vulnerable age." 64 They suggested that
desegregation efforts are similar to geographic migration: "[T]he elementary
school years are an important period for establishing social relationships, so
that social relationship should not be disrupted during this time." 65 Their
research therefore suggests that school districts should do their utmost to
create an integrated educational environment during the early years of
elementary school.
62 Robert Crain & Rita Mahard, Desegregation & Black Achievement: A Review of
the Research, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 17 (1978).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 36-37.
65 Id. at 38.
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Second, they concluded that the curriculum available at the desegregated
school has an important effect on educational gains. They note that some
researchers have suggested that one is more likely to see gains in math than
reading as a result of desegregation, but they account for that difference by
observing that it is simply often easier to make major changes in a math
curriculum. Because of the role of curriculum in creating educational effects,.
they note that some segregated schools with strong curriculums have
managed to compare favorably with desegregated schools in their community
in some subject areas. 66 In terms of their research, one would expect that
modem "magnet" schools that highlight strong curriculums in certain subject
areas would particularly benefit from accompanying desegregation effects.
Third, their research resulted in the somewhat surprising conclusion that
mandatory desegregation plans are more likely to achieve positive academic
results for black children than voluntary plans. They examined each of the
mandatory or voluntary desegregation studies very carefully and concluded
that only two well-designed studies using voluntary desegregation
demonstrated a positive educational outcome for black children. By contrast,
they found seven strong studies involving mandatory desegregation that
reflected positive educational outcomes for black children.67 They carefully
considered various hypotheses to explain these counterintuitive results and
tried to relate them to previous observations about the challenges inherent in
social migration for children. They suggested that black children fare better
under mandatory desegregation programs because the desegregated school
might be making stronger attempts to adjust in order to accommodate them.
Further, black children may be more likely to move to a new school with
peers from their neighborhood. 68 More recent studies have concluded that
"there are stronger achievement gains when desegregation is voluntary." 69
The Crain and Mahard study was consistent with the findings from an
article authored nearly two decades later by Maureen Hallinan. 70 As Crain
and Mahard had, Hallinan carefully reviewed the empirical evidence on
student performance in various learning environments and examined what
factors were most likely to be associated with strong academic performance
for minority students in majority-white schools. She found that "[t]he earlier
a black student is placed in a majority white school or classroom, the higher
66 Id. at 38-39.
6 7 Id. at 40.
68 Crain & Mahard, supra note 62, at 45-47.
69 Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at App.
14, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-908 and 05-915).
70 Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science
Evidence, 59 OHIO ST. L. J. 733 (1998).
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the student's academic achievement."'71 She also found that "cooperative
learning techniques" that fostered friendships between minority and white
children were associated with positive educational outcomes for minority
children. 72 From these various findings, she concluded that "peer influence,
role modeling, instructional quality, and educational expectations are factors
that transmit the effects of desegregation to student achievement. '73 Then,
stepping back to consider broad research on how students learn, she
concludes: "[I]t is not desegregation per se that improves achievement, but
rather the learning advantages some desegregated schools provide. '74 In
other words, desegregation only produces positive educational outcomes for
minority children if accompanied by some of the other factors discussed by
Hallinan (as well as Crain and Mahard).
These studies could have been used by the Court to assess whether the
Seattle and Louisville desegregation efforts were likely to be successful.
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion discusses none of these studies; they only
receive mention from other members of the Court. Justice Thomas cites the
Crain and Mahard study for the proposition that some scholars "have
concluded that black students receive genuine educational benefits" from
what he calls "racial balancing." 75 Crain and Mahard, however, disavow an
interest in being put in the "positive" or "negative" camp for the effects of
desegregation. 76 The purpose of their study was to identify factors that lead
to successful programs rather than proclaim that all desegregation efforts are
positive or negative. 77
As for the Hallinan article, Justice Thomas dismisses its usefulness
quickly by noting Hallinan's ending observation about the importance of the
learning opportunities available at the desegregated school.78 But he takes
that observation completely out of context, not acknowledging the careful
previous discussion about what factors are likely to lead to positive
educational outcomes. The fact that Hallinan does not simplistically attribute
desegregation to a positive educational outcome does not mean that she
considers desegregation to be an irrelevant factor. As are Crain and Mahard,
she is trying to help shape social policy by giving school districts insight into
how to achieve effective desegregation.
7 1 Id. at 742.
72 Id. at 742-43.
73 Id. at 744.
74 Id.
75 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2776.
76 See Crain & Mahard, supra note 62, at 47-49.
7 7 Id. at 49.
78 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2776 n.11.
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Justice Thomas's opinion gives significant weight to studies that tried to
determine whether desegregation, as a whole, has led to positive educational
outcomes for minority children. One of the most thorough literature reviews
provided to the Court on this topic was an amicus brief written on behalf of
the social scientists David J. Armor, Abigail Thernstrom, and Stephan
Thernstrom. 79 While acknowledging that the Crain and Mahard study did
find positive results for children who benefited from desegregation in early
grades, they concluded that there is "no clear and consistent evidence" that
desegregation produces positive educational outcomes for minority
children. 80 Not surprisingly, other social scientists submitted amicus briefs
disputing Armor and colleagues' overall conclusion, suggesting that their
argument rested on "incomplete analyses of the literature, critiques of well-
established scientific methodologies, and reliance on studies that are outdated
or inconsistent with more recent research. ' 81 This amicus brief, like the
Armor et al. brief, does not offer good guidance on what kind of educational
program is likely to generate positive results. The fact that desegregation
may have produced a range of results is not a very surprising (or helpful)
finding. More important is which factors tend to lead to successful
desegregation attempts.
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Seattle is often seen as the pivotal opinion
because it provides the important fifth vote to strike down the school
districts' race-conscious desegregation efforts. Because his opinion is less
sweeping than that of Chief Justice Roberts in dismissing the use of race in
school assignments, school officials are likely to read his opinion closely for
hints as to how they might fashion a constitutionally permissible race-
conscious plan. The Kennedy opinion, however, does not reflect
consideration of any of the empirical work on effective desegregation
programs. His sole concern seems to be how "narrowly tailored" is the use of
race.82 He suggests ways that school districts might attain desegregation and
use less race-conscious mechanisms such as "strategic site selection of new
schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of neighborhood
demographics; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students
and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and
79 Brief of David. J. Armor, Abigail Themstrom & Stehpan Thernstrom as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (Nos. 05-908 and 05-
915) [hereinafter Armor Brie].
80 Id. at 29.
81 Brief of the American Educational Research Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 2 n.3., Parents Involved, 127 S.Ct. 2738 (Nos. 05-908 and 05-
915).
82 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2744.
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other statistics by race." 83 Kennedy is correct that those mechanisms might
be more "narrowly tailored," but the more important question should be: Are
they likely to produce better educational results for African-American
children? Justice Kennedy's opinion notes that the famous axiom that "our
Constitution is color-blind" cannot be a universal constitutional principle if
we are to overcome a legacy of race discrimination in the United States.8 4
Nonetheless, he uses the "color-blind" criterion as the primary yardstick in
determining the constitutionality of a school's desegregation efforts.
Justice Thomas and Justice Breyer extensively cite empirical literature in
their opinions in the Parents Involved case but primarily use those citations
to determine whether desegregation has led overall to positive educational
outcomes for minority children. Neither opinion spends much, if any, time
isolating what factors might lead to positive educational outcomes. Although
Justice Kennedy seeks to offer a middle ground position that leaves open the
possibility of the narrow use of race-conscious mechanisms to attain
integration, he does not rely on empirical research to identify acceptable
race-conscious mechanisms.
B. Empirical Literature Not in the Parents Involved Litigation
One problem for the Supreme Court in these kinds of cases is that it is
being presented with empirical evidence for strategic purposes-in support
of arguments made by proponents of a particular position. The justices may
not have the inclination or the skills to read these studies closely or to look
beyond the studies called to their attention by litigants.
Undoubtedly, there are many studies that the Court could have examined
that were not cited by litigants, possibly because they did not lend themselves
to quick "sound bites" that could be cited in support of one proposition or
another. In this section, I would like to examine some data not discussed by
the Court that might lend insight into how to develop effective integration
programs that are likely to lead to positive educational outcomes for minority
children. 85 Data collected from the Texas public schools, which are not cited
by the Court in the Parents Involved litigation, support the argument that
minority students are likely to improve their academic performance if they
attend integrated schools rather than predominantly black schools. As do the
83 Id. at 2745.
84 Id. at 2791-92.
85 1 have examined these data closely because they were the most comprehensive
data that I was able to locate while writing this Article. I am not an expert in this area and
would welcome others to examine other data that might be available. My discussion
simply reflects the kinds of questions we might ask of such data, and what conclusions
might be plausible.
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data discussed earlier, their data also support the argument that integration
must start in the early grades and must create genuine, rather than token,
integration to be effective.
The Texas data are remarkable and provide many opportunities for
researchers to consider many important policy issues. The Texas Schools
Microdata Panel (TSMP) collected data for more than two million students
over at least an eight-year period. 86 The data contain more than twenty-six
years/grades of standardized test data for three different standardized tests.87
The students are identified by many factors and the data include millions of
records.88
The first assessment of these data that is relevant to the present study is
the relationship between where African-American children receive their
education (suburbs or inner city) and educational levels. John F. Kain and
Daniel M. O'Brien studied that question for a working paper series published
by the Cecil and Ida Green Carter Center for the Study of Science and
Society. 89 After controlling for many factors, including the prior year's
reading or math score, they concluded that African-American students who
would move from an inner-city school in Texas to a suburban school would
be likely to see a "substantial improvement" in educational attainment as
measured by standardized tests.90 In this 1998 study, they did not discuss the
differences between suburban and inner-city school districts as being one of
the differences in racial composition. They simply considered the suburban
schools to be "better" schools and concluded that African Americans would
be likely to show substantial improvement in standardized test scores if they
were able to attend these suburban schools. 91
Two years later, they offered a refined version of the prior paper.92 In
this paper, they provided the percentage of black enrollment in inner-city and
86 John F. Kain & Daniel M. O'Brien, Black Suburbanization in Texas Metropolitan
Areas and its Impact on Student Achievement 2 (Educ. Res. Serv. Ctr., ERIC No.
ED478407, 2000), available at http://eric.ed.gov./ERICdocs2sq/ contentstorage_01/
00000196/80/1b/Of.pdf.
87 Id. at 2-3 n.1.
88 John F. Kain & Daniel M. O'Brien, How Much Has Moving to the Suburbs
Increased African American Educational Opportunities? 2-3 n. 1 (Jan. 5, 1998) (paper
prepared for the meetings of the American Economic Association, Chicago, Illinois)
(unpublished article, on file with the Cecil and Ida Green Center for the Study of Science
and Society working paper series), available at
www.utdallas.edu/research/tsp/pdfpapers/aeapapj229f.pdf.
89 Kain & O'Brien, supra note 86.
90 Id. at 35.
91 Id.
92 See Kain & O'Brien, supra note 88.
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suburban school districts. Not surprisingly, the percentage of all students
who were African American was higher in the inner city than suburban
school districts. 93 They described "inner city black exposure to Anglos" as
about 11 percent during the years of the study and "suburban black exposure
to Anglos" as ranging from 42 to 47 percent during the years of the study. 94
(Anglos are not a majority in the suburban districts because of the presence
of Asians and Hispanics.) This paper made two other observations not found
in the prior paper. First, they investigated whether access to suburban schools
has as big an influence on Asian, Hispanic, and Anglo students as it does on
African-American students. While they found that attending a suburban
school had a positive impact on those groups, they found that the effect was
smaller than for African-American students. 95 Further, they tried to quantify
what would be the result if more African-American students attended
suburban schools. They concluded that "attending a school of average
suburban quality would eliminate nearly 58 percent of the black-white
achievement gap for fifth graders, 27 percent of the black-white achievement
gap for sixth graders and nearly 38 percent of the black-white achievement
gap for seventh graders. ''96
Finally, in 2002, John Kain joined with Eric Hanushek and Steven
Rivkin to ask how school racial composition affects student academic
achievement.97 Using the same data set, they were able to control for school
quality, differences in student abilities, and family background. After
controlling for these factors, they concluded that the academic performance
of African Americans was better in integrated settings than in settings with
high concentrations of African-American students. 98 This effect was
strongest for those in the upper half of the ability distribution; in fact, there
was only statistical significance for those in the top two quartiles of
9 3 Id. at 31, tbl. 3.
94 Id. at 10.
9 5 Id. at 25.
9 6 Id. at 23-24.
97 Eric A. Hanushek, John F. Kain & Steven G. Rivkin, New Evidence About Brown
v. Board of Education: The Complex Effects of School Racial Composition on
Achievement 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8741, 2002),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8741. They updated their data further in 2008,
reaching the same conclusions. Eric A. Hanushek, John F. Kain & Steven G. Rivkin, New
Evidence About Brown v. Board of Education: The Complex Effects of School Racial
Composition on Achievement (rev. Jan. 2008), available at
http://edpro.stanford.edu/Hanushek/files det.asp?FileId=142. For a critique of the
Hanushek data, see David J. Armor, Lessons Learned from School Desegregation in
GENERATIONAL CHANGE: CLOSING THE TEST ScORE GAP 115 (Paul E. Peterson ed.,
2006).
98 Hanushek et al., supra note 97, at 28.
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achievement. 99 The racial composition of the classroom was not found to
have a significant impact on the academic performance of whites or
Hispanics, strongly suggesting that the results were not a simple reflection of
unmeasured school quality.
Their research suggests that it is very important to begin integration,
especially for high-achieving African Americans, in the early grades because
the effects of integration are cumulative. 100 Moreover, 10 percent changes in
racial composition can have a statistically significant effect on the
achievement of African-American children. They reported: "The magnitude
of the proportion black coefficient for blacks of -0.25 suggests that a 10
percentage point reduction in percentage black would raise annual
achievement growth by 0.025 standard deviations. These estimated effects
apply to the growth of annual achievement and thus accumulate over
grades."'' This 10 percent figure is important because, as we have seen in
Seattle and Louisville, school districts have been permitting a large degree of
racial imbalance before requiring racial desegregation efforts. Yet, this
empirical literature suggests that more than a 10 percent racial imbalance
should not be permitted, especially for high-achieving African-American
students.
While no empirical research is perfect, other researchers have described
the Texas study as effectively controlling "for a variety of potential
confounding factors, including student-specific rates of change in
achievement test scores and hard-to-measure factors that vary at the level of
the school-by-grade or even attendance zone-by-year."' 1 2 Reviewing the
available studies, these researchers have also concluded, "A complete
elimination in district efforts to integrate public schools could raise test score
gaps significantly in some cases." 10 3 That conclusion was offered before the
9 9 id. at 25.
100 Willis Hawley, in a nonempirical book chapter, agrees with the conclusion that
what he calls "diverse learning opportunit[ies]" are most beneficial if they begin in early
grades. See Willis D. Hawley, Designing Schools That Use Student Diversity to Enhance
Learning of All Students, in LESSONS IN INTEGRATION: REALIZING THE PROMISE OF
RACIAL DIVERSITY IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 32 (Ericka Frankeberg & Gary Orfield eds.,
2007).
101 Hanushek et al., supra note 97, at 23.
102 Jacob Vigdor & Jens Ludwig, Segregation and the Black- White Test Score Gap
20-21 Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12988, 2007, available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2988.
103 Id. at 24.
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Seattle decision made it more difficult for school districts to engage in
desegregation efforts. 104
The most significant critique of the Texas data has been offered by David
Armor in an amicus brief he submitted in the Seattle case and in an article he
authored primarily to dispute the results from the Texas study.'0 5 The gist of
his critique is that the Texas data cannot be accurate because it is not
consistent with other studies of the effectiveness of school desegregation
plans. In the amicus brief, he suggests that the Hanushek study must be
wrong because it "is not consistent with the case studies above and may
reflect a problem with the model or the data."'10 6 Yet, he never identifies with
any specificity what those problems might be. Similarly, in his 2006 article
which seeks to critique the Hanushek study, he concludes that Hanushek
must be wrong because other researchers in Texas, using other
methodological strategies, have reached different findings. 0 7 The Hanushek
study, however, examined test results over time whereas the other Texas
studies were cross-sectional. 108 The fact that a longitudinal study reveals
different results than a cross-sectional study does not mean that the data from
the longitudinal study are inaccurate. Although Armor criticizes the lower
courts in the Seattle litigation for reviewing a "very limited and biased
record,"'1 9 his review of the record has a similar problem because he
dismisses one of the largest data sets ever constructed on student educational
performance to reach his conclusions about the ineffectiveness of
desegregation efforts. 110
104 Professor St. John drew a similar conclusion in some of her earlier work. She
concluded: "[E]arly school desegregation as well as classroom percentage white
contributed significantly and positively to sense of environmental control, even with SES
held constant." NANCY H. ST. JOHN, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION: OUTCOMES FOR CHILDREN
53 (1975) (referencing McPartland's 1968 reanalysis of the Coleman report data).
Similarly, Professor Mickelson concluded that racial isolation at an early age had an
adverse effect on African-Americans, suggesting that desegregation efforts should try to
reach the early grades. See Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Subverting Swann: First- and
Second-Generation Segregation in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 38 AM. EDUC.
RES. J. 215, 229-31 (2001).
105 Armor Brief Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-0908 and 05-
915); Armor, supra note 97.
10 6 Armor Brief at 21 n.41 Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-0908
and 05-915).
107 Armor, supra note 97, at 136.
108 Id. at 97.
10 9 Armor Brief at 11, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (Nos. 05-0908 and
05-915).
110 In other work, Armor also goes to great lengths to dismiss the value of any work
that suggests that desegregation leads to positive educational outcomes for African-
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While the Texas data offer some of the best support for the positive value
of desegregation efforts, other studies also support such conclusions. Jomills
Braddock and Tamela Eitle did a literature review of both the short term and
long term effects of desegregation on various measures including academic
achievement. I I They concluded that the evidence supports both short term
and long term gains-the desegregation of schools allows African Americans
to attain higher academic achievement in the short term which leads to them
surmounting structural barriers to employment in the long term.ll 2 Similarly,
Jonathan Guryan examined the effect that school desegregation has on high
school drop-out rates. 113 Using census data, and controlling for various
factors, he concluded that desegregation caused a two to three percent
dropout rate for black students, but had little or no effect on the dropout rate
for white students.1 4 Districts that were more effectively integrated showed
greater decline in the dropout rate. 115 Unlike the studies, though, that
emphasized the importance of desegregation efforts starting early, this study
found that there was no evidence that length of exposure to desegregation
had a "compounding effect on dropout rates." ' 1 6 Dropping out of school,
however, is not the same as academic performance, so this is not a different
result of much significance.
The study that best supports the Hanushek study from the Texas data is
one conducted by Shelly Brown-Jeffy. 117 She examined test data from the
Americans. Although he notes that the reading scores of African-Americans were closer
to those of whites when the school was between 61 and 99 percent white, he rejects this
result as not "reliable." David J. Armor & Christine H. Rossell, Desegregation and
Resegregation in the Public Schools in BEYOND ThE COLOR LINE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 219, 243 (Abigail Themstrom & Stephan Thernstrom
eds., 2002), available at http://media.hoover.org/documents/0817998721219.pdf.
Similarly, Armor and Rossell note that math scores improve in schools that are over 40
percent white but they do not credit those results as being related to desegregation
because the scores of both whites and African-Americans improved. Id. at 250-51.
I ll Jomills Henry Braddock II & Tamela McNulty Eitle, The Effects of School
Desegregation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 828-843
(James A. Banks & Cherry A. McGee Banks eds., 2d ed. 2004).
112 Id. at 829.
113 Jonathan Guryan, Desegregation and Black Dropout Rates, 94 AM. ECON. REv.
919, 919 (2004).
15 Id.
116Id. at 935.
117 Shelly Brown-Jeffy, The Race Gap in High School Reading Achievement: Why
School Racial Composition Still Matters, 13 RACE, GENDER & CLASS 268 (2006). See
also Shelly Brown-Jeffy, School Effects: Examining the Race Gap in Mathematics
Achievement, J. AFR. AM. STUD., (2008), http://www.springerlink.com/
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early 1990s to determine the influence of school racial composition on the
achievement gap between Black, Hispanic, Native American, and White
students.li 8 The dependent variable for the study was twelfth grade reading
achievement.' 19 For the purpose of this study, she grouped Black, Hispanic
and Native American into one category (but did not include Asians in her
minority category). Her results support the "critical mass" argument for
effective school desegregation-that the best academic results are achieved
when the school is 10-24% minority. 120 "[S]chools with less than 10%
Black, Hispanic and/or Native American student populations are not the
schools that exhibit the largest mean reading achievement scores, even when
controlling for socioeconomic status." 121 This research therefore supports the
argument that desegregation is more likely to achieve positive educational
results for minority children when it is more than token integration.
At the conclusion of his Article, Armor notes that there is inconsistent
evidence about what types of desegregation programs are effective. 122 He
suggests that it would be a positive outcome if research could clarify why
"black concentration appears to have adverse effects on black achievement in
some states or school districts but not others."'123 This Article has suggested
two factors that might cause desegregation efforts to be effective-early
exposure to integration and more than token integration. Sufficient evidence
supports those strategies that school districts should be given the leeway to
try to improve minority educational performance through such mechanisms.
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in the Parents Involved litigation presents
school districts with few effective options. Justice Kennedy is considered to
be the "swing vote" in this kind of litigation, and he did not embrace the
most extreme formal equality language found in Chief Justice Roberts's
opinion. But there is no reason to believe that Justice Kennedy would have
preferred Seattle or Kentucky to engage in more use of race to attain
substantive equality. Playing into the formal equality model, he embraced the
notion that race should be used as little as possible in school assignments. As
content/94700718m3k15684/fulltext.pdf (finding that schools with 30-49% Black or
Hispanic students exhibit more equivalent math test scores between White and Hispanic
students than schools with more than 50% Black or Hispanic students).
1
'
8 Id. at 273.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 285.
121 Id.
122 Armor, supra note 97, at 140.
123 Id.
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this Article has argued, that kind of minimalist approach might appease the
parents of white children but is unlikely to attain substantive equality for
African-American children.
It would appear that the primary hope for progress in the racial area is for
a transformation in the membership of the Supreme Court. The only good
news is that the Texas school data suggest that meaningful integration can
help attain dramatic increases in educational attainment for African-
American children.' 24 The bad news is that neighborhood housing patterns
are unlikely to attain such integration "naturally," and the Supreme Court has
precluded the kind of race-conscious policies that can attain those results
deliberately.
While formal equality notions may have assisted the Court in rejecting
segregation in Brown v. Board of Education, it has outlived its usefulness as
a vehicle to attain substantive equality. An anti-subordination perspective
that does not reflexively dismiss race-conscious tools is needed to attain
genuine equality in our society. Some school districts are willing to
implement such tools, but they can only do so in a more receptive legal
environment.
124 This is not to suggest that more integration necessarily leads to positive results.
Any change in educational policy must be constructed carefully to be effective. Willis
Hawley has done an excellent job describing what types of diverse learning opportunities
are likely to lead to positive outcomes. See Hawley, supra note 100. He has found that
certain racial balances lead to better outcomes, that it is best to begin integration in the
early grades for it to be effective, that it is useful to engage in collaborative cross-racial
projects which value rather than stereotype differences, and that various school policies
and environments can help create more beneficial diverse learning environments.
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